The Economics of Sumo

 The Economics of Sumo

Written by: Michael Trotier

Economics can be observed everywhere. Even in the most obscure of things, such as sumo wrestling. 

Surprisingly, sumo is actually a very corrupt sport, with most matches being rigged. And it’s incredibly easy to do. All a wrestler must do to ensure that their next few matches (in a future tournament) are theirs is to, ironically, lose matches. 

So, why would a wrestler who could potentially win another match purposely let his opponent win? The answer to that is incentive. A sumo tournament works like this: each tournament there are 66 competitors, who are matched up with 15 other wrestlers each with a total of 15 matches in the tournament. In order to move up in the ranks, a wrestler must win at least 8 out of those 15 matches. However, the unlucky few who do not achieve lucky number 8 fall in the ranks. The reason why there is such an incentive to rise in the ranks is not only for the obvious reason of recognition, but also for perks of not having to do the chores of lower ranked wrestlers (getting up early, cleaning, etc.), and the main reason, salary, with a $3,000 increase per rank. Therefore, wrestlers will do anything to ensure that they get these 8 wins, which leads to rigging. The rigging of future matches is always set during the final matches of previous tournaments. Let’s say a wrestler who is up 8:6 is in his final match. According to Mark Duggan, professor of economics at Stanford, statistically, 75% of the time in these cases of 8:6 scores, the wrestler’s opponent wins, setting the final score at 8:7. One might argue that “the opponent had more determination than the wrestler who was already in the clear,” however, this is not the case. What happens is that the wrestler, who has already reached 8 wins, realizes that they have nothing to lose, and then makes a deal with their opponent. They propose that they can help their opponent minimize their loss in the ranks by maximizing their opponent’s wins, without letting them reach 8 wins. In return however, the wrestler who was just given the win must promise to let that wrestler beat them in future matchups of future tournaments. They then use these guaranteed “wins” for future tournaments so that they can again reach 8 wins, and then use the rest of their matches as IOU’s.

 

http://pubs.aeaweb.org/action/showImage?doi=10.1257/000282802762024665&iName=master.img-000.png&w=191&h=132 From Mark Duggan and Steven D. Levitt’s: Winning Isn’t Everything

This graph, taken from Stephen D. Levitt, author of Freakonomics, and Mark Duggan’s study, shows just how important the eighth win is. With a negative change in rank for every tournament win until it drastically increases once it reaches 8.

Each time a wrestler proposes this deal, they are making an opportunity cost by choosing not to win more than 8 matches, as a wrestler can maximize their “profit” by winning additional matches, therefore rising even higher in rankings. However, by choosing to invest in future wins, wrestlers are able to play conservatively. It’s a vicious cycle where wrestlers race to 8, in order to make room for deals for the next tournament.

Wrestlers who don’t support the rigging also can’t do much to stop it. Firstly, a wrestler must either get lucky in their first tournament or have the talent to win the 8 matches, and then spend their rest on rigging. If a wrestler doesn’t achieve this, their career is essentially over. These unlucky wrestlers are then forced to take the deals so that they don’t fall completely out of the ranks. From this, the good wrestlers and the alright wrestlers are determined early on, and it’s very difficult to change that. It’s similar to seeding in sports.

So why do officials allow this? Money. The officials don’t get a cut of the money or anything like that, but they are able to make more money from spectators than they used to in the final matches. Before, spectators would not show up as much to the final matches, as the winners are pretty much already determined. However, after seeing many of the underdog, not-so-good wrestlers beat the high ranking wrestlers in the final matches, it attracted attention. Now the audience is more interested in the outcome of the final matches as they know there will always be an upset.

But what can be done to stop this? There isn’t much but there are some solutions. As mentioned, the officials won’t do anything to stop the corruption, and even the wrestlers who fight against it can’t do anything. My solution would be to remove the incentive by changing the point system of the tournaments and instead following a tournament bracket. This way, wrestlers don’t have the “8 wins” to focus on and instead would have to focus on winning to advance. Another approach would be to increase the media scrutiny on the issue. When people or groups are corrupt, their main goal is to be able to continue their corruption without being caught. Most people know of the rigging in sumo matches, however, the amount of rigging doesn’t go down until the media actually reports on it, with the officials minimizing the rigging in order to hide it.

In conclusion, do you agree? Disagree? What other solutions do you have?

Works Cited

Duggan, Mark, and Steven D. Levitt. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling." University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons, University of Pennsylvania, Dec. 2002, repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=hcmg_papers. Accessed 19 Oct. 2020.

"The Numbers in Sumo Cheating: Freakonomics Movie." YouTube, 29 Aug. 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=NKZzGiS5hv0. Accessed 19 Oct. 2020.

Steelman, Aaron. "The Economics of...Sumo Wrestling." Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2003/summer/~/media/AC03C0CCD75846D1A53B9B208951D397.ashx. Accessed 19 Oct. 2020.